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Does It Really Matter?: Making the Case 
for a Materiality Requirement in False 
Claims to U.S. Citizenship Under the 
Immigration and Nationality Act 
ELIZABETH MONTANO* & EDWARD F. RAMOS** 
Materiality plays an important role in limiting the reach 
of laws that penalize misrepresentations. Laws that include 
no materiality element punish any covered misrepresenta-
tion regardless of its relevance—like lying about hair color 
on a loan application. By contrast, laws that include a ma-
teriality element withhold punishment for immaterial mis-
representations of that kind—in other words, misrepresenta-
tions that have no tendency to affect the ultimate decision. 
Our immigration laws make it a deportable offense for a 
noncitizen to “falsely represent” herself as a U.S. citizen for 
a purpose or benefit under the law. Although this law has 
been on the books for decades, a key question about its reach 
remains open: Does it include a materiality element? The 
Board of Immigration Appeals and three federal circuit 
courts have said “yes,” holding that misrepresentations of 
U.S. citizenship must be material to trigger deportability. 
But in a recent panel decision adopted by the en banc court, 
the Eleventh Circuit said “no,” holding that the unambigu-
ous statutory text includes no materiality element. 
This Article examines the history of these immigration 
statutes and demonstrates why the Eleventh Circuit’s hold-
ing was wrong, although mainly for a reason no court has 
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 **  Edward Ramos is a partner in the law firm Kurzban Kurzban Tetzeli & 
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yet addressed: the common-law origins of the relevant stat-
utory text. Under well-established principles of statutory 
construction, Congress is presumed to legislate with the un-
derstanding that common-law phrases carry their common-
law meaning. At common law, the phrase “false representa-
tion” carried with it an implicit materiality element. There-
fore, the immigration statutes at issue presumptively incor-
porate materiality because they penalize “false representa-
tions” of U.S. citizenship. This presumption is confirmed by 
other contextual clues. And, as this Article explains, ensur-
ing fidelity to the statutes’ implicit materiality element is es-
pecially important given the statutes’ breadth and the dra-
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 INTRODUCTION  
In 1996, Congress added a pair of provisions to the Immigration 
and Nationality Act (the “INA”) that make noncitizens removable 
from the United States for falsely claiming U.S. citizenship.1 These 
provisions are triggered when a noncitizen “falsely represents” her-
self as a U.S. citizen “for any purpose or benefit under . . . Federal 
or State law.”2 
Despite being on the books for nearly a quarter century, a critical 
question about these provisions has yet to be definitively answered: 
Do immaterial misrepresentations trigger this provision? Or, put dif-
ferently, will a false representation of citizenship trigger these pro-
visions even if citizenship status has no possible bearing on the pur-
pose or benefit at issue? 
The Eleventh Circuit said “yes.”3 In a panel opinion, the Elev-
enth Circuit held that the unambiguous language of the statute in-
cludes no materiality element.4 And the court, sitting en banc in the 
same case, reaffirmed that holding.5 As a result, noncitizens whose 
immigration cases arise in the Eleventh Circuit are deportable from 
the United States for making false representations of U.S. citizen-
ship, even if those representations had no possible legal or practical 
impact.6 That holding conflicts with a precedent decision of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals (the “BIA”), as well as the law of 
three other circuits.7 
As this Article will demonstrate, the Eleventh Circuit was 
wrong—most obviously for a reason that no court has yet addressed: 
 
 1 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 
(“IIRIRA”), Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 344(a), 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-637 (codi-
fied at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii), 1227(a)(3)(D)). 
 2 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii), 1227(a)(3)(D). This Article refers to these 
provisions together as the “false-citizenship provisions.” 
 3 See Patel v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 917 F.3d 1319, 1332 (11th Cir. 2019), aff’d 
en banc, 971 F.3d 1258 (11th Cir. 2020). 
 4 Patel, 917 F.3d at 1332. 
 5 Patel, 971 F.3d at 1284 (“We need not disturb the panel’s ruling that the 
statute lacks a materiality element.”). 
 6 See id. at 1264–65 (discussing the dissent of one BIA member, which rec-
ognized that “Georgia extended driver’s licenses to those with lawful status” and 
that the petitioner “did not need citizenship to obtain the license”).  
 7 See infra Part II. 
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the common-law origins of the false-citizenship provisions’ text.8 
Specifically, these provisions use a variant of “false representa-
tion”—a term long understood to incorporate a materiality element 
at common law.9 Under well-established principles of statutory con-
struction, that common-law meaning is incorporated into the stat-
ute.10 The Eleventh Circuit’s contrary reasoning is unpersuasive, 
and the court was therefore wrong to hold that these important im-
migration provisions lack a materiality element. 
Part I of this Article discusses the history of materiality under 
U.S. law, and Part II discusses the history of the INA’s false-citizen-
ship provisions and the jurisprudence establishing that the provi-
sions contain an implicit materiality requirement. Part III summa-
rizes the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Patel v. United States Attor-
ney General11 that the false-citizenship provisions do not contain a 
materiality requirement. Part IV concludes this Article by discussing 
the flaws in the Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning and explaining its det-
rimental consequences. 
I. A HISTORY OF MATERIALITY IN U.S. LAW AND WHY IT 
MATTERS 
Materiality limitations have long played a role in common-law 
penalties for misrepresentations. For example, as early as the 17th 
century, British jurists recognized that the common-law crime of 
perjury requires, among other elements, that a false statement be 
material to the matter at issue.12 As statutes gradually supplanted the 
common law, these materiality limitations were often preserved.13 
Many federal statutes thus incorporate a materiality element—from 
 
 8 See infra Part IV. 
 9 See infra Part I. 
 10 See LARRY M. EIG, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL97589, STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATION: GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND RECENT TRENDS 3–7 (2014), 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/97-589.pdf (discussing how a term’s “accepted mean-
ing governs” when the term has “had an accepted and specialized meaning at 
common law”). 
 11 Patel v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 917 F.3d 1319, 1332 (11th Cir. 2019), aff’d en 
banc, 971 F.3d 1258, 1284 (11th Cir. 2020).  
 12 Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 769 (1988). 
 13 Id. at 769–70. 
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criminal perjury,14 to securities law,15 to tax law,16 to mail and wire 
fraud.17 
Immigration law is no exception; a variety of immigration pro-
visions penalizing misrepresentations, including in the denaturaliza-
tion and visa-application contexts,18 have been understood to incor-
porate a materiality element.19 
In its typical formulation, “a concealment of misrepresentation 
is material if it ‘has a natural tendency to influence, or was capable 
of influencing, the decision of’ the decisionmaking body to which it 
was addressed.”20 While “[m]ateriality can be a subjective and neb-
ulous standard,”21 at base, the requirement ensures that only misrep-
resentations that actually mattered (or might have mattered) are pe-
nalized. 
 
 14 See United States v. Mandanici, 205 F.3d 519, 522–23 (2d Cir. 2000) (dis-
cussing 18 U.S.C. § 1001). 
 15 See Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 563 U.S. 27, 37 (2011) (dis-
cussing 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b–5(b)). 
 16 Kawashima v. Holder, 565 U.S. 478, 483–84 (2012) (“[A] violation of [26 
U.S.C.] § 7206(1) include[s] . . . that the document in question was false as to a 
material matter, [and] that the defendant did not believe the document to be true 
and correct as to every material matter . . . .”); Boulware v. United States, 552 
U.S. 421, 424 n.1 (2008) (“[P]rovision[] 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1)[] criminalizes the 
willful filing of a tax return believed to be materially false.”). 
 17 See infra Part IV.A. 
 18 See Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 507–08, 507 n.28 (1981) 
(discussing the Displaced Persons Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-774, 62 Stat. 1009 
and 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a)). 
 19 See Chapter 2 - Overview of Fraud and Willful Misrepresentation, U.S. 
CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERV., (Mar. 30, 2021) https://www.uscis.gov/policy-
manual/volume-8-part-j-chapter-2 (“[M]isrepresentation of a material fact may 
lead to . . . adverse immigration consequences.”). 
 20 Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 770 (1988) (citing Weinstock v. 
United States, 231 F.2d 699, 701 (D.C. Cir. 1956)). There are other formulations 
of “materiality” as well. See, e.g., id. at 786–87 (Stevens, J., concurring) (describ-
ing “materiality” as “distinguish[ing] the trivial from the substantive”). For a dis-
cussion of various formulations of materiality and how differences in the formu-
lations can affect a case’s outcome, see Mary C. Stakun, Note, Materiality in the 
Denaturalization Context: Kungys v. United States, 23 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 161, 
174–79 (1990) (describing the various approaches to materiality of the Justices in 
Kungys and illustrating how those approaches might lead to different outcomes). 
 21 Timothy M. Todd, The Pernicious Effect of Dubious Materiality, 12 
LIBERTY U. L. REV. 315, 324 (2018). 
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II. MATERIALITY AND THE INA’S FALSE-CITIZENSHIP 
PROVISIONS 
Under U.S. immigration law, the Department of Homeland Se-
curity may place a noncitizen in removal proceedings if the noncit-
izen is either “inadmissible” or “deportable” under the INA.22 The 
INA uses the term “inadmissible” to refer to noncitizens who have 
yet to be legally admitted to the United States.23 In removal proceed-
ings, these noncitizens are subject to “inadmissibility” grounds24 
and must prove that they are “admissible” to the United States.25 In 
turn, the INA uses the term “deportable” to refer to noncitizens who 
have legally entered the United States but who are subject to depor-
tation.26 Unless they are granted discretionary relief, noncitizens 
who are inadmissible or deportable can be removed from the United 
States.27 
In 1996, Congress added a pair of provisions to the INA that 
render inadmissible and deportable “[a]ny [noncitizen] who falsely 
represents, or has falsely represented, himself or herself to be a citi-
zen of the United States for any purpose or benefit under . . . Federal 
or State law.”28 These provisions were added as part of the Illegal 
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 199629—
a statute enacted “to improve deterrence of illegal immigration into 
the United States . . . by improving the verification system for the 
 
 22 See Dakura v. Holder, 772 F.3d 994, 998 n.7 (4th Cir. 2014). 
 23 See 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (inadmissibility grounds). 
 24 Id. 
 25 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(2)(A) (placing the burden of proof on the “applicant 
for admission” to prove “clearly and beyond doubt” that she is “not inadmissible 
under section 1182” of the INA). 
 26 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (deportability grounds). 
 27 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3)(A) (placing the burden of proof on the government 
to “establish[] by clear and convincing evidence that, in the case of a [noncitizen] 
who has been admitted to the United States, the [noncitizen] is deportable”). No-
tably, this Article uses the term “noncitizen” to replace the term “alien.” 
 28 IIRIRA, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 344(a), 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-637 
(codified at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii), 1227(a)(3)(D)). Because the operative 
language of the false-citizenship provisions is identical, courts frequently interpret 
the provisions in tandem and rely on interpretations of one provision to interpret 
the other. See Dakura v. Holder, 772 F.3d 994, 999 (4th Cir. 2014); see also, e.g., 
Ferrans v. Holder, 612 F.3d 528, 531 (6th Cir. 2010). 
 29 IIRIRA § 334, 110 Stat. at 3009–637. 
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eligibility for employment.”30 Congress enacted the false-citizen-
ship provisions to “prevent [noncitizens] from taking American 
jobs,”31 to discourage noncitizens from “‘abus[ing] . . . the welfare 
system’ through fraudulent applications for public benefits,”32 and 
to “‘disincentiv[ize] falsely claiming citizenship’ during the em-
ployment verification process.”33 Congress, in other words, enacted 
these provisions to prevent noncitizens from lying about their citi-
zenship to obtain benefits they were ineligible to receive. 
The federal courts and the BIA have both parsed these provi-
sions’ requirements.34 One key aspect they have examined is what 
qualifies as a “purpose or benefit . . . under Federal or State law,” 
thereby triggering inadmissibility or deportability.35 Courts of ap-
peals have determined that obtaining private-sector employment,36 
applying for a U.S. passport,37 and obtaining entry into the United 
States38 all qualify as a “purpose or benefit” under the false-citizen-
ship provisions. 
In 2010, the Sixth Circuit and Third Circuit issued opinions 
seemingly at odds on what counts as a “purpose or benefit.”39 In 
Dwumaah v. United States Attorney General, the Third Circuit held 
that a noncitizen was deportable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(3)(D) for 
 
 30 H.R. REP. No. 104–828, at 199 (1996); see also Castro v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 
671 F.3d 356, 368–69 (3d Cir. 2012); Sandoval v. Holder, 641 F.3d 982, 985–86 
(8th Cir. 2011). 
 31 142 CONG. REC. H11080 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 1996) (statement of Rep. La-
mar Smith). 
 32 Id.; Castro, 671 F.3d at 369 (quoting 142 CONG. REC. H11080 (daily ed. 
Sept. 25, 1996) (statement of Rep. Lamar Smith)). 
 33 Castro, 671 F.3d at 369 (quoting 142 CONG. REC. 10,030 (1996)); 142 
CONG. REC. S4017–18 (daily ed. Apr. 24, 1996) (statement of Sen. Alan Simp-
son). 
 34 See, e.g., Theodros v. Gonzales, 490 F.3d 396, 402 (5th Cir. 2007); Matter 
of Richmond, 26 I. & N. Dec. 779, 779 (B.I.A. 2016). 
 35 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii), 1227(a)(3)(D). 
 36 Theodros, 490 F.3d at 402; Kechkar v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 1080, 1083–84 
(10th Cir. 2007); Naser v. Gonzales, 123 F. App’x. 624, 624–25 (5th Cir. 2005) 
(per curiam). 
 37 Sowah v. Gonzales, 196 F. App’x. 576, 577 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 38 Valadez–Munoz v. Holder, 623 F.3d 1304, 1306–07, 1309 (9th Cir. 2010); 
Valenzuela–Solari v. Mukasey, 551 F.3d 53, 54 (1st Cir. 2008); Jamieson v. Gon-
zales, 424 F.3d 765, 768 (8th Cir. 2005). 
 39 Compare Dwumaah v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 609 F.3d 586, 589 (3d Cir. 2010), 
with Hassan v. Holder, 604 F.3d 915, 928–29 (6th Cir. 2010). 
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falsely claiming U.S. citizenship on a federal student-loan applica-
tion.40 In contrast, the Sixth Circuit held in Hassan v. Holder that a 
noncitizen was not deportable for falsely claiming U.S. citizenship 
on a Small Business Administration (“SBA”) loan application.41 
The Third Circuit reconciled these seemingly conflicting hold-
ings in Castro v. United States Attorney General.42 Examining the 
loan applications at issue in Dwumaah and Hassan, the Third Circuit 
recognized one key difference: “the relevance of the applicant’s cit-
izenship status.”43 While U.S. citizenship was required to obtain the 
federal student loan at issue in Dwumaah, the opposite was true of 
the SBA loan at issue in Hassan.44 The Third Circuit thus recognized 
that “the relevance of the [noncitizen]’s citizenship status” con-
strained the reach of the false-citizenship provisions.45 Applying this 
analysis, the Third Circuit held that 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii) did 
not apply to a noncitizen who falsely told state police he was a U.S. 
citizen because “citizenship status had no bearing on the police de-
partment’s handling of his arrest.”46 
In 2013, the Second Circuit joined the Third and Sixth Circuits 
in tackling the false-citizenship provisions’ meaning. In Richmond 
v. Holder, the Second Circuit recognized that “the statutory lan-
guage cannot be read so broadly that it fails to exclude anything,”47 
but “neither the parties, nor the BIA, nor the courts of appeals” had 
yet “ma[de] clear the precise basis on which certain kinds of mis-
representations can be said to fall outside the requirement’s 
scope.”48 Specifically, the court concluded that Hassan and Castro 
had “left open the important question of whether the presence of a 
‘purpose or benefit’ is determined objectively—based on whether 
 
 40 Dwumaah, 609 F.3d at 589. 
 41 Hassan, 604 F.3d at 928–29. 
 42 Castro v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 671 F.3d 356, 370–71 (3d Cir. 2012). 
 43 Id. at 370. 
 44 Id. Indeed, the Sixth Circuit itself recognized in Hassan that the govern-
ment had not shown (1) “how, if at all, [the noncitizen]’s immigration status 
would affect [his] loan application” or (2) that the noncitizen’s subjective purpose 
in making the false claim was to affect his ability to receive the loan. Hassan, 604 
F.3d at 928–29. 
 45 Castro, 671 F.3d at 370. 
 46 Id. at 370–71. 
 47 Richmond v. Holder, 714 F.3d 725, 729 (2d Cir. 2013). 
 48 Id. at 730. 
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citizenship status would actually affect” the purpose or benefit, or 
“subjectively, based on the effect that a non-citizen intends his or 
her citizenship claim to have.”49 Because of the risk “that, in the 
absence of some clear limitation on what [the provision’s scope] en-
compasses, the ‘purpose or benefit’ clause will itself serve no pur-
pose, and provide no benefit, within the INA,”50 the Second Circuit 
remanded to the BIA “to explain in the first instance” its understand-
ing of the provision’s requirements.51 
The Second Circuit’s remand prompted the BIA to issue Matter 
of Richmond, a precedential decision interpreting the false-citizen-
ship inadmissibility provision.52 In Matter of Richmond, the BIA ex-
amined federal-court decisions that had interpreted the false-citizen-
ship provisions, including Castro, Hassan, and Dwumaah.53 As the 
Third Circuit had done in Castro, the BIA recognized that “only in 
Dwumaah was citizenship status a prerequisite to the loan’s ap-
proval—in other words, citizenship status actually affected the stu-
dent loan application.”54 
Synthesizing these decisions, the BIA held that a noncitizen’s 
false-citizenship claim must meet two requirements to trigger inad-
missibility.55 First, the noncitizen must have made the claim “with 
the subjective intent of achieving a purpose or obtaining a bene-
fit . . . .”56 “Second, the presence of a purpose or benefit must be 
determined objectively—that is, the United States citizenship must 
actually affect or matter to the purpose or benefit sought.”57 In other 
words, the false-citizenship claim must have been material.58 
 
 49 Id. 
 50 Id. 
 51 Id. at 731 (“‘[W]e cannot comfortably ascertain the proper outcome in this 
case in the absence of a set of standards’ to use in applying the statute; yet ‘were 
we to generate standards ourselves, we would be forced to start essentially from 
scratch’ . . . . [T]he better practice . . . is to remand to the BIA.” (quoting Liu v. 
Gonzales, 455 F.3d 106, 116 (2d Cir. 2006))). 
 52 Matter of Richmond, 26 I. & N. Dec. 779, 783–89 (B.I.A. 2016). 
 53 Id. at 785–86. 
 54 Id. at 786. 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id. 
 57 Id. at 786–87. 
 58 The BIA ultimately ruled that the noncitizen’s false representation of U.S. 
citizenship satisfied both requirements, and ordered the noncitizen removed. Id. 
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III. THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION IN PATEL 
The Eleventh Circuit entered the interpretive fray in Patel v. 
United States Attorney General.59 In Patel, the Eleventh Circuit re-
jected Matter of Richmond’s second requirement—that a false rep-
resentation be material—as inconsistent with the statute’s plain 
meaning.60 
The lead petitioner in Patel, Pankajkumar Patel, had lived in the 
United States for over twenty years before he was placed in removal 
proceedings.61 For much of this time, Mr. Patel lived in Georgia, and 
he had obtained several driver’s licenses under Georgia law.62 In 
2008, Mr. Patel made a critical misstep when renewing his driver’s 
license: He checked a box answering “Yes” to a question that asked 
whether he was a U.S. citizen.63 This prompted the government to 
deny Mr. Patel’s green-card application and to place him in removal 
proceedings.64 
In removal proceedings, Mr. Patel raised two defenses to inad-
missibility under § 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I), tracking Matter of Rich-
mond’s two-prong test.65 First, Mr. Patel testified that he checked 
the U.S.-citizen box by mistake, and therefore lacked the subjective 
intent to misrepresent his citizenship.66 Second, he argued that ob-
jectively, his misrepresentation was immaterial because he was eli-
gible for a driver’s license under Georgia law regardless of his citi-
zenship.67 
 
at 789–90. On further review, the Second Circuit held that the BIA’s interpretation 
of the statute was reasonable and entitled to deference. See Richmond v. Sessions, 
697 F. App’x 106, 107 (2d Cir. 2017) (holding that, because “BIA’s reading is a 
reasonable one and . . . the statute is ambiguous,” Second Circuit would “refrain 
from replacing its reading with the one Richmond urges upon us”). 
 59 Patel v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 917 F.3d 1319, 1332 (11th Cir. 2019), aff’d en 
banc, 971 F.3d 1258 (11th Cir. 2020). 
 60 Id. 
 61 Id. at 1322. 
 62 Id. at 1322–23. 
 63 Id. at 1323. 
 64 Id. 
 65 Id.  
 66 Id. 
 67 Id. Under Georgia law at the time of Mr. Patel’s misrepresentation, “an 
applicant who present[ed] in person valid documentary evidence of . . . other fed-
eral documentation verified by the United States Department of Homeland 
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The immigration judge and the BIA rejected both arguments. 
First, they disbelieved Mr. Patel’s testimony that he had unwittingly 
checked the box, concluding instead that he had done so knowingly 
for the purpose of obtaining a Georgia driver’s license.68 Second, 
they held that the false representation was material because, in their 
view, Mr. Patel would not have received a license had he disclosed 
his actual immigration status.69  
A three-judge panel of the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.70 The court 
first held it lacked jurisdiction to consider Mr. Patel’s argument that 
he lacked subjective intent.71 The court did, however, reach the mer-
its of Mr. Patel’s second argument regarding materiality.72 
 
Security to be valid documentary evidence of lawful presence in the United States 
under federal immigration law” was eligible “to be issued a temporary license, 
permit, or special identification card. See GA. CODE ANN. § 40-5-21.1(a) (2008) 
(emphasis added). Moreover, an Employment Authorization Document, which 
Mr. Patel held at the time, was sufficient to show such “lawful presence.” See 
Information for Non US Citizens, GA. DEP’T OF DRIVER’S SERVS., https://web.ar-
chive.org/web/20081217105635/http://www.dds.ga.gov/driv-
ers/DLdata.aspx?con=1741471757&ty=dl (archived Dec. 17, 2008) (listing an 
employment authorization document as acceptable to “prove legal presence in the 
[United States]”); Drivers from Other Nations, GA. DEP’T OF DRIVER SERVS., 
https://web.archive.org/web/20080627010530/http://www.dds.ga.gov/driv-
ers/DLdata.aspx?con=1747371440&ty=dl (archived Feb. 17, 2008) (stating that 
the Department of Driver Services would accept any valid document that author-
izes a noncitizen to be present in the United States). That rule has since been cod-
ified in Georgia’s regulations. See GA. COMP. R. & REGS. § 375-3-1-.02(3)(e) 
(2020) (noting that documents acceptable to establish identity of a customer seek-
ing to renew a driver’s license include an “[u]nexpired employment authorization 
document (EAD) issued by the DHS”). 
 68 Patel, 917 F.3d at 1323, 1327. 
 69 Id. As noted, this holding appears to have been incorrect, given that Geor-
gia allowed applicants in Mr. Patel’s situation to obtain at least a temporary 
driver’s license. See supra note 67. In fact, one BIA member dissented for exactly 
this reason, recognizing that Mr. Patel “did not need citizenship to obtain the li-
cense” given that he would have qualified for a license based on his status as a 
green-card applicant. See Patel, 917 F.3d at 1324; In re: Jyotsnaben P Patel 
Pankajkumar Somabhai Patel Nishantkumar Patel, 2017 WL 1045537, at *4 (BIA 
Jan. 17, 2017) (Wendtland, Board Member, dissenting). 
 70 Patel, 917 F.3d at 1332. 
 71 Id. at 1324. The court’s holding turned on its interpretation of 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(i). See id. That jurisdictional issue is beyond the scope of this 
Article. 
 72 Id. at 1325–32. 
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In a break with Matter of Richmond and the earlier circuit prec-
edent on which that decision was based, the panel held that the false-
citizenship provisions include “no materiality element.”73 The stat-
ute, the panel observed, penalizes “false representation[s].”74 And a 
person “can make a false representation with the goal of obtaining a 
benefit, even if the false representation does not help them achieve 
that goal.”75 The court therefore reasoned that the statute’s plain text 
unambiguously excludes a materiality element.76 
The panel opinion bolstered this interpretation by relying on 
negative implication—the notion that “where Congress includes 
particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another 
section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts 
intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclu-
sion.”77 The court observed that “Congress did include a materiality 
element in the immediately preceding subsection 
[8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i)], which says: ‘Any [noncitizen] who, 
by fraud or willfully misrepresenting a material fact, seeks to pro-
cure . . . [an immigration benefit] is inadmissible.’”78 From this, the 
panel inferred that Congress would have used the word “material” 
in the false-citizenship provision had it intended the provision to 
reach only material misrepresentations.79 
The panel also found support for its holding in Kungys v. United 
States.80 In Kungys, the Supreme Court analyzed 
8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(6), which provides that a person lacks “good 
moral character” and is ineligible for naturalization if he or she “has 
given false testimony for the purpose of obtaining any benefits under 
[immigration law].”81 Like § 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I), the false-testi-
mony provision at issue in Kungys does not use the word “mate-
rial.”82 And the Kungys Court held that the false-testimony provision 
“does not distinguish between material and immaterial 
 
 73 Id. at 1328. 
 74 Id. 
 75 Id. 
 76 Id. 
 77 Id. (quoting Ela v. Destefano, 869 F.3d 1198, 1202 (11th Cir. 2017)). 
 78 Id. (emphasis added) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i)). 
 79 Id. (citing Destefano, 869 F.3d at 1202). 
 80 Id. at 1329 (discussing Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 779 (1988)). 
 81 Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(6)). 
 82 Id. 
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misrepresentations.”83 Observing that the texts of the two provisions 
are “strikingly similar,” the Eleventh Circuit determined that 
Kungys supported the court’s conclusion that § 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I) 
also lacks a materiality requirement.84 
The panel concluded by rejecting the BIA’s materiality holding 
in Matter of Richmond as “flawed and unclear.”85 Moreover, the 
panel determined that a materiality requirement is not necessary to 
limit the statute’s reach to ensure it is not “read so broadly that it 
fails to exclude anything.”86 Instead, the panel asserted that the stat-
ute’s “under Federal or State law” language was enough to limit its 
reach: While “the text does not require that the purpose or benefit 
sought be one restricted or available only to citizens,” the purpose 
or benefit still must arise under the law.87 Thus, the Eleventh Circuit 
held that the false-citizenship provision “does not require that citi-
zenship be material to the purpose or benefit sought.”88 
The Eleventh Circuit reheard Patel en banc, principally to decide 
a jurisdictional issue unrelated to the materiality question.89 While 
the court vacated the panel opinion when it agreed to rehear the case 
en banc, the court’s en banc opinion summarily adopted the panel 
opinion’s holding on materiality.90 
IV. WHY PATEL WAS WRONGLY DECIDED 
As we will demonstrate below, the Eleventh Circuit’s holding 
on materiality was wrong.91 But that is so principally for a reason 
that neither the Eleventh Circuit nor any other court has yet consid-
ered: the common-law origins of the phrase “false representation.” 
That phrase originates in the common law and carries with it a 
 
 83 Kungys, 485 U.S. at 779. 
 84 Patel, 917 F.3d at 1329. 
 85 Id. at 1331. 
 86 Id. at 1332 (quoting Matter of Richmond, 26 I. & N. Dec. 779, 784 (B.I.A. 
2016)). 
 87 Id. 
 88 Id. 
 89 Patel v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 971 F.3d 1258, 1265 (11th Cir. 2020). 
 90 Id. at 1284 (“We need not disturb the panel’s ruling that the statute lacks a 
materiality element.”). 
 91 See infra Part IV. 
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materiality element.92 Thus, even though the false-citizenship pro-
visions do not use the word “material,” they incorporate a material-
ity requirement by virtue of their use of common-law language.93 
When viewed against this backdrop, none of the Eleventh Circuit’s 
justifications for rejecting materiality withstands scrutiny. 
A. The Common-Law Meaning of “False Representation” 
Carries a Materiality Element 
A well-established canon of statutory interpretation holds that 
“[w]here Congress uses terms that have accumulated settled mean-
ing under . . . the common law, a court must infer, unless the statute 
otherwise dictates, that Congress means to incorporate the estab-
lished meaning of these terms.”94 Under this canon, a statute incor-
porates a materiality element if it uses language understood to in-
clude such an element at common law—even if the statute does not 
explicitly use the word “material.” 
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that the term “false represen-
tation”—or its equivalent “misrepresentation”95—is such a com-
mon-law term and, as a result, its usage “impl[ies] elements that the 
common law has defined [it] to include.”96 One of the common-law 
elements of a “false representation” is materiality;97 thus, the Su-
preme Court and numerous circuit courts have repeatedly under-
stood statutes that use the term “false representation” to contain a 
 
 92 See supra Part I; infra Part IV.A. 
 93 See infra Part IV.A. 
 94 Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 21 (1999); NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., 
453 U.S. 322, 329 (1981). 
 95 “False representation” and “misrepresentation” are synonyms. See False 
Representation, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (defining the term by 
way of cross reference to “misrepresentation”); Misrepresentation, BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“misrepresentation” is “[a]lso termed false repre-
sentation”). 
 96 Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59, 69 (1995). The inadmissibility and deportabil-
ity grounds for false-citizenship representations were enacted just months after 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Field. See IIRIRA, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 
§ 344(a), 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-637. This proximity in time only strengthens 
the presumption that Congress meant to incorporate the common-law meaning of 
“false representation.” See id.; Field, 516 U.S. at 69. 
 97 United States v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482, 494 (1997) (a false “representation” 
can imply “a materiality element” (citing Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 
781 (1998))). 
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materiality requirement, even when they do not use the word “ma-
terial.”98 
For example, in Fedorenko v. United States, the Supreme Court 
interpreted a provision in the Displaced Persons Act of 1948 (the 
“DPA”),99 which rendered inadmissible any “person who shall will-
fully make a misrepresentation for the purpose of gaining admission 
into the United States.”100 Although the statute did not explicitly use 
the word “material,” the Court held that the “provision only applies 
to willful misrepresentations about ‘material’ facts.”101 As the Court 
later explained, this “conclusion . . . was grounded in the word ‘mis-
representation,’ which has been held to [imply materiality] in many 
contexts,” including at common law.102 
The Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion in Neder v. 
United States, in which it interpreted the “federal mail fraud, wire 
fraud, and bank fraud statutes.”103 These statutes prohibit obtaining 
money or property “by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, rep-
resentations, or promises.”104 And they make no mention of the 
word “material.” Nevertheless, the Court held that “materiality of 
falsehood is an element” of these statutes, because of the common-
law roots of the terms used in the statutes.105 
Federal circuit courts, too, have recognized the common-law 
meaning of “false representation.” For example, the Fair Debt Col-
lection Practices Act prohibits debt collectors from using “any false, 
deceptive, or misleading representation” and identifies numerous 
 
 98 See., e.g., Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 507 (1981); Bryan v. 
Credit Control, LLC, 954 F.3d 576, 582 (2d Cir. 2020); Jensen v. Pressler & 
Pressler, 791 F.3d 413, 421 (3d Cir. 2015); Powell v. Palisades Acquisition XVI, 
LLC, 782 F.3d 119, 126 (4th Cir. 2014); Van Hoven v. Buckles & Buckles, 
P.L.C., 947 F.3d 889, 894 (6th Cir. 2020); Hahn v. Triumph P’ships LLC, 557 
F.3d 755, 757 (7th Cir. 2009); Hill v. Accts. Receivable Servs., LLC, 888 F.3d 
343, 346 (8th Cir. 2018); Donohue v. Quick Collect, Inc., 592 F.3d 1027, 1033 
(9th Cir. 2010). 
 99 Displaced Persons Act (“DPA”), Pub. L. No. 80-774, 62 Stat. 1009, 1013 
(1948). 
 100 Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 495, 507–08 (quoting DPA § 10, 62 Stat. at 1013). 
 101 Id. at 507 (emphasis added). 
 102 Kungys, 485 U.S. at 781. 
 103 Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 25 (1999). 
 104 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343, 1344. 
 105 Neder, 527 U.S. at 25. 
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“false representations” that violate the law.106 These statutes do not 
use the word “material.” Yet numerous circuits have held that a false 
statement must be material to be actionable under the statute.107 This 
is in line with the well-established meaning of “false representation” 
in the common-law tort context.108 
Because the false-citizenship provisions similarly use the lan-
guage of “false representation,” they too incorporate materiality. 
The Eleventh Circuit never grappled with this point in either the 
panel opinion or the en banc decision reaffirming the panel’s hold-
ing.109 Had it done so, the court would have recognized that, con-
trary to its decision, the false-citizenship provisions include a mate-
riality element. 
 
 106 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. 
 107 See, e.g., Bryan v. Credit Control, LLC, 954 F.3d 576, 582 (2d Cir. 2020) 
(“[W]e have held that . . . only material errors violate Section 1692e.”); Jensen v. 
Pressler & Pressler, 791 F.3d 413, 421 (3d Cir. 2015) (“[A] false state-
ment . . . must be material . . . .”); Powell v. Palisades Acquisition XVI, LLC, 782 
F.3d 119, 126 (4th Cir. 2014) (“A logical corollary of the least sophisticated con-
sumer test is that false, deceptive, and misleading statements must be material to 
be actionable.”); Van Hoven v. Buckles & Buckles, P.L.C., 947 F.3d 889, 894 
(6th Cir. 2020) (“One [requirement] is that a claim must turn on a material mis-
statement.”); Hahn v. Triumph P’ships LLC, 557 F.3d 755, 757 (7th Cir. 2009) 
(“Materiality is an ordinary element of any federal claim based on a false or mis-
leading statement.”); Hill v. Accts. Receivable Servs., LLC, 888 F.3d 343, 346 
(8th Cir. 2018) (“[A] false but non-material statement is not actionable.”); 
Donohue v. Quick Collect, Inc., 592 F.3d 1027, 1033 (9th Cir. 2010) (“[A] false 
or misleading statement is not actionable under § 1692e unless it is material.”). 
 108 See, e.g., Christidis v. First Pa. Mortg. Tr., 717 F.2d 96, 99 (3d Cir. 1983) 
(describing “an action for false representation” as requiring demonstration of a 
“specific false representation of material facts” (quoting CHARLES C. CLARK, 
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING § 48 (2d ed. 1947))); Palmacci v. 
Umpierrez, 121 F.3d 781, 786 (1st Cir. 1997) (identifying the elements of “the 
common law tort of false representation” as including materiality concepts); In re 
Hardin, 458 F.2d 938, 940 (7th Cir. 1972) (recognizing that “[t]he Wisconsin 
common law of false representations, similar to that of most states,” required a 
showing that the false representation was material to aggrieved party). 
 109 See Patel v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 917 F.3d 1319, 1332 (11th Cir. 2019), aff’d 
en banc, 971 F.3d 1258 (11th Cir. 2020); Patel, 971 F.3d at 1284. 
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B. The Eleventh Circuit’s Reliance on Negative Implication 
Was Misplaced 
In holding that the false-citizenship provisions lack a materiality 
element, the Eleventh Circuit relied heavily on the negative-impli-
cation canon, which dictates that “where Congress includes particu-
lar language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section 
of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts inten-
tionally and purposefully in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.”110 
As discussed in Part III, the court applied this canon by compar-
ing the false-citizenship provision at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii) to 
the neighboring generic-misrepresentation provision at 
§ 1182(a)(6)(C)(i).111 Unlike the false-citizenship provision, the ge-
neric-misrepresentation provision explicitly includes a materiality 
element by stating that any noncitizen “who, by fraud or willfully 
misrepresenting a material fact, seeks to procure . . . [an immigra-
tion benefit] is inadmissible.”112 Because it could not find “persua-
sive evidence to the contrary,” the court reasoned that Congress’s 
use of the word “material” in the generic-misrepresentation provi-
sion reflected its intent not to incorporate a materiality element into 
the false-citizenship provision.113 
But the Eleventh Circuit was wrong to rely on negative implica-
tion because the Supreme Court has held that the common-law lan-
guage canon takes precedence over the negative-implication 
canon.114 As the Court has stated, negative implication is “weakest” 
when pitted against “common-law language at work in [a] stat-
ute.”115 In fact, the Court has expressly declined to apply the nega-
tive-implication canon to strip the words “false representation” or 
“misrepresentation” of their common-law materiality element be-
cause Congress’s “drafting choice” not to enumerate the elements 
implied in common-law language does not “deprive” those 
 
 110 Ela v. Destefano, 869 F.3d 1198, 1202 (11th Cir. 2017) (quoting Duncan 
v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 173 (2001)); Patel, 917 F.3d at 1328. 
 111 See supra Part III. 
 112 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i) (emphasis added). 
 113 Patel, 917 F.3d at 1328. 
 114 See Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59, 75–76 (1995). 
 115 Id. (rejecting the negative-implication inference because of the common-
law language at play in 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)). 
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common-law phrases “of a significance richer than the bare state-
ment of their terms.”116 
The panel also wrongly relied on Kungys.117 While the Supreme 
Court held that “false testimony” did not incorporate a materiality 
requirement, it explicitly noted that “false testimony” was not a 
common-law term.118 Yet the Supreme Court has repeatedly recog-
nized that the term “false representation” originates in the common 
law and carries a materiality requirement with it.119 Accordingly, the 
Eleventh Circuit was wrong to hold that “false representation” ex-
cludes a materiality element.120 
As discussed above, the Eleventh Circuit never addressed the 
meaning of “false representation” under the common law.121 If it 
had, it would have recognized that the provisions’ common-law lan-
guage takes precedence over negative implication122 and is “persua-
sive evidence” overriding any such negative implication.123 Because 
“false representation” includes materiality, the Eleventh Circuit 
should have relied on “the rule that Congress intends to incorporate 
the well-settled meaning of the common-law terms it uses.”124 Thus, 
the Eleventh Circuit could not simply “infer from the absence of an 
express reference to materiality that Congress intended to drop that 
element” from § 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I).125 Instead, it should have 
“presume[d] that Congress intended to incorporate materiality ‘un-
less the statute otherwise dictates.’”126 Because nothing in 
§ 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I) “dictates” otherwise,127 the statute must be 
construed to incorporate materiality, and the Eleventh Circuit was 
wrong to adopt a contrary reading. 
 
 116 Id. at 69. 
 117 Patel, 917 F.3d at 1329. 
 118 Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 781 (1988) (emphasis added). 
 119 See supra Part IV.A. 
 120 See Patel, 917 F.3d at 1329. 
 121 Kungys, 485 U.S. at 781. 
 122 See Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59, 75–76 (1995). 
 123 See Patel, 917 F.3d at 1328. 
 124 Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 23 (1999). 
 125 Id. 
 126 Id. (quoting Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 322 
(1992)). 
 127 Id. 
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The Eleventh Circuit’s reliance on the negative-implication 
canon is flawed for several other reasons. 
First, although § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i) (the generic misrepresentation 
inadmissibility provision) and § 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii) (the false-citizen-
ship inadmissibility provision) are adjacent in the U.S. Code, they 
were enacted more than forty years apart. The generic misrepresen-
tation provision traces its roots to the Immigration and Nationality 
Act of 1952.128 The false-citizenship provision, by contrast, was not 
enacted until 1996.129 This four-decade gap erodes any negative-im-
plication inference as “‘negative implications raised by disparate 
provisions are strongest’ in those instances in which the relevant 
statutory provisions were ‘considered simultaneously when the lan-
guage raising the implication was inserted.’”130 
The force of negative implication is further diminished because 
the language and structure of the two provisions are not closely par-
allel. As the Supreme Court has explained, the presumption “grows 
weaker with each difference in the formulation of the provisions un-
der inspection.”131 Here, the generic misrepresentation provision, in 
relevant part, bears little resemblance to the false-citizenship 
 
 128 See Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 414, § 212(a)(6)(C)(i), 
66 Stat. 163, 183 (1952) (rendering inadmissible “[a]ny [noncitizen] who seeks to 
procure, or has sought to procure, or has procured a visa or other documentation, 
or seeks to enter the United States, by fraud, or by willfully mispresenting a ma-
terial fact”). 
 129 See IIRIRA, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 344(a), 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-637. 
 130 Gomez-Perez v. Potter, 553 U.S. 474, 486 (2008) (quoting Lindh v. Mur-
phy, 521 U.S. 320, 330 (1997)) (declining to apply presumption to provisions en-
acted seven years apart). Notably, Congress has never enacted a similar generic-
misrepresentation provision to the deportability grounds of the INA. See 
8 U.S.C. § 1227. Thus, the negative-implication argument cannot logically apply 
to the false-citizenship deportability provision at 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(3)(D). And 
because the false-citizenship deportability provision was enacted at the same time 
as the false-citizenship inadmissibility provision at § 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii), see supra 
notes 28–33 and accompanying text, the court’s reliance on the negative-implica-
tion canon in this context is especially weak.  
 131 Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59, 75–76 (explaining how the negative implica-
tion canon is “strong[est]” when applied to “contrasting statutory sections origi-
nally enacted simultaneously” and “weakest when it suggests results strangely at 
odds with other textual pointers, like . . . common-law language”); see also City 
of Columbus v. Ours Garage & Wrecker Serv., Inc., 536 U.S. 424, 435–36 (2002) 
(stating that the case for “inference” from negative implication is “more persua-
sive” when “the [relevant] omission [is] the sole difference”). 
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provision. In fact, given the phrasing of the false-citizenship provi-
sion, the word “material” cannot be inserted anywhere in a way that 
renders the provision both grammatically and semantically accurate. 
For example, the Eleventh Circuit suggested that Congress could 
have expressly incorporated materiality by inserting the word “ma-
terial” before the phrase “purpose or benefit,” so that the provision 
would read as follows: “Any [noncitizen] who falsely repre-
sents . . . himself or herself to be a citizen of the United States for 
any [material] purpose or benefit under this chapter . . . or any other 
Federal or State law is inadmissible.”132 But in that hypothetical for-
mulation, the word “material” modifies the wrong concept; it is not 
the “purpose or benefit” under federal or state law that must be “ma-
terial” but the false representation of U.S. citizenship that must be 
material to the purpose or benefit.133 Because the two provisions are 
structurally dissimilar, the negative-implication canon’s force is es-
pecially weak.134 
For these reasons, the negative-implication canon is of little 
value in interpreting the false-citizenship provisions. 
C. The Context and Purpose of the False-Citizenship 
Provisions Support a Materiality Requirement 
The Eleventh Circuit’s reliance on Kungys was based on a fun-
damental misunderstanding of the Supreme Court’s decision. While 
 
 132 Patel v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 917 F.3d 1319, 1328 (11th Cir. 2019) (quoting 8 
U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I)), aff’d en banc, 971 F.3d 1258 (11th Cir. 2020). 
 133 See id. (emphasis added). 
 134 Notably, while the panel highlighted the mismatch in use of the word “ma-
terial” across subsections (a)(6)(C)(i) and (a)(6)(C)(ii)(I), it ignored a similar mis-
match within subsection (a)(6)(C)(i) itself. By its plain terms, the generic-misrep-
resentation provision reaches two kinds of conduct: (1) “fraud,” and (2) “willfully 
misrepresenting a material fact.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i). If negative implica-
tion overrides common-law language, then “fraud” would contain no materiality 
element because the word “material” does not modify “fraud.” But “fraud” under 
the provision has long been held to incorporate a materiality element. See Ortiz-
Bouchet v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 714 F.3d 1353, 1356 (11th Cir. 2013) (per curiam) 
(“[T]he BIA has held that fraud [under this provision] ‘consist[s] of false repre-
sentations of a material fact made with knowledge of its falsity and with intent to 
deceive the other party.’” (third alteration in original) (quoting Matter of G–G–, 
7 I. & N. Dec. 161, 164 (B.I.A. 1956))). Thus, the panel’s reasoning would lead 
to a construction of the generic-misrepresentation provision that is at odds with 
its longstanding meaning. 
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the Eleventh Circuit believed that Kungys “bolster[ed]” its reading 
of the false-citizenship provision,135 in truth Kungys undermines it. 
The false-testimony provision addressed in Kungys states that 
“[n]o person shall be regarded as, or found to be, a person of good 
moral character who, during the period for which good moral char-
acter is required to be established is, or was . . . one who has given 
false testimony for the purpose of obtaining any benefits under this 
chapter.”136 In Kungys, the Supreme Court refused to read in a ma-
teriality requirement to this provision, in part because the provision 
was “part of a definition of what constitutes a lack of ‘good moral 
character’ for purposes of qualifying for immigration.”137 Accord-
ing to the Supreme Court, this language was very different from pro-
visions previously found to contain an implicit materiality ele-
ment.138 
For example, provisions like the inadmissibility provision at is-
sue in Fedorenko have the purpose “to punish and thereby deter mis-
representation in the immigration process.”139 A materiality limita-
tion makes sense in a provision like this one, designed to punish and 
deter, especially considering the common-law meaning of the word 
“misrepresentation.”140 In contrast, the purpose of the false-testi-
mony provision at issue in Kungys was to “identify lack of good 
moral character,” which “appears to some degree whenever there is 
a subjective intent to deceive, no matter how immaterial the decep-
tion.”141 Thus, imposing a materiality requirement on the false-tes-
timony provision made little sense. This was especially true consid-
ering the provision was sufficiently limited and applied only to “oral 
 
 135 Patel, 917 F.3d at 1329. 
 136 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f), 1101(f)(6). 
 137 Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 782 (1988). 
 138 Id. at 780–82. 
 139 Id. at 780, 782 (stating that the purpose of the provision at issue in Fe-
dorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490 (1981), was “to prevent false pertinent 
data from being introduced into the naturalization process (and to correct the re-
sult of the proceedings where that has occurred)”). 
 140 Id. at 781. 
 141 Id. at 780. Noncitizens are required to show “good moral character” as an 
explicit part of many immigration applications, including naturalization, see 8 
U.S.C. § 1427(a), and cancellation of removal for non-lawful permanent resi-
dents, see id. § 1229b(b)(1)(B). 
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statements made under oath . . . with the subjective intent of obtain-
ing immigration benefits.”142 
Contrary to the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion, the false-citizenship 
provision at issue in Patel is more closely aligned with the inadmis-
sibility provision in Fedorenko than the false-testimony provision in 
Kungys. Congress enacted the false-citizenship provisions to dis-
courage noncitizens from evading employment-verification laws or 
“‘abus[ing] . . . the welfare system’ through fraudulent applications 
for public benefits.”143 Congress was, in other words, concerned 
with preventing noncitizens from making false citizenship-claims to 
obtain benefits they were ineligible to receive. This is precisely the 
sort of legislative purpose for which a materiality requirement is 
most appropriate.144 
On the other hand, the provision is decidedly unlike the false-tes-
timony provision at issue in Kungys. Not only does the false-citizen-
ship provision—unlike the false-testimony provision—contain 
common-law language that traditionally requires materiality, but it 
has also been held to cover even noncitizens who genuinely believe 
they are U.S. citizens. In other words, the false-citizenship provision 
has been held to apply to noncitizens who—unlike those found to 
lack good moral character under the false-testimony provision—
have engaged in no willful deception or any other morally culpable 
conduct.145 
 
 142 Kungys, 485 U.S. at 780. 
 143 Castro v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 671 F.3d 356, 368–69 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing 
legislative history). 
 144 See Kungys, 485 U.S. at 780, 782 (explaining that a materiality requirement 
makes sense for statutes enacted “to prevent false pertinent data from being intro-
duced” or “to punish and thereby deter misrepresentation”). The Eleventh Circuit 
was therefore mistaken to suggest that “[a]pplying the statute even when citizen-
ship is immaterial advances the legislation’s purpose.” See 917 F.3d at 1331. “No 
law pursues its purpose at all costs,” Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 752 
(2006), and the statutory context here suggests Congress was especially concerned 
with people claiming U.S. citizenship to obtain benefits reserved for U.S. citizens, 
see supra notes 28–33 and accompanying text. 
 145 See Matter of Zhang, 27 I. & N. Dec. 569, 571 (B.I.A. 2019) (holding that 
a noncitizen “is not required to know that a claim to citizenship is false” to be 
found inadmissible or deportable under the false-citizenship provisions). The va-
lidity of the BIA’s holding in Zhang is beyond the scope of this Article. But one 
key point deserves attention: There is a difference between knowledge that a 
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Accordingly, the statutory context and purpose strongly support 
the materiality element Congress included through its use of com-
mon-law language. 
D. Ambiguity in Immigration Statutes Must Be Resolved in 
Favor of Noncitizens 
The Eleventh Circuit should have resolved any remaining doubt 
as to whether the false-citizenship provisions incorporate a materi-
ality element by applying the principle that removal statutes must be 
narrowly construed in favor of noncitizens.146 This principle has 
special force when interpreting inadmissibility or deportability 
grounds that carry particularly harsh consequences. 
 
representation of U.S. citizenship was made at all and knowledge that such a rep-
resentation was false. While the BIA in Zhang held that the latter is not required 
under the false-citizenship provision, the earlier unquestionably is required be-
cause the provision’s plain language triggers inadmissibility only if made “for” 
some “purpose or benefit” under federal or state law. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii) 
(emphasis added). Because “the word ‘for’ is a function used to indicate purpose, 
an intended goal, or the object of an activity,” a person who inadvertently repre-
sents himself as a U.S. citizen falls outside the false-citizenship provision’s 
reach—such a person cannot logically intend that his accidental citizenship rep-
resentation serve a purpose or benefit. Patel v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 917 F.3d 1319, 
1328 (11th Cir. 2019), aff’d en banc, 971 F.3d 1258 (11th Cir. 2020); see also 
Lawson v. Fortis Ins. Co., 301 F.3d 159, 165 (3d Cir. 2002) (“The word ‘for’ 
connotes intent.”). 
  The Eleventh Circuit’s panel opinion confused this distinction by suggest-
ing that § 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I) incorporates no knowledge requirement of any kind 
because, if it did, the narrow exception for certain noncitizens who “reasonably 
believed” they were U.S. citizens “would [be] render[ed] superfluous.” Patel, 917 
F.3d at 1326; see 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(II) (exempting noncitizens whose 
parents are or were U.S. citizens, who “resided in the United States prior to at-
taining the age of 16,” and who “reasonably believed at the time of making such 
representation that he or she was a citizen”). But that exception deals not with 
inadvertent representations of U.S. citizenship, but rather with knowing ones 
made without knowledge of their falsity. Thus, interpreting § 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I) 
to require knowledge that a representation of U.S. citizenship was made at all, 
consistent with the provision’s use of the word “for,” would not render the 
§ 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(II) exception surplusage. 
 146 INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 449 (1987); see also INS v. St. 
Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 320 (2001); Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2415 (2019) 
(recognizing that “a court must exhaust all the ‘traditional tools’ of construction” 
before finding ambiguity (quoting Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Coun-
cil, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984))). 
2021] DOES IT REALLY MATTER? 1237 
 
And the false-citizenship provisions are undoubtedly harsh—so 
harsh, in fact, they have been described as “the ‘immigrant version 
of the death penalty.’”147 Unlike many other removal grounds, the 
false-citizenship provisions are not waivable.148 A noncitizen gen-
erally “is not required to know that a claim to citizenship is false” to 
trigger inadmissibility or deportability.149 The only exception ap-
plies to noncitizens who (1) “permanently resided in the United 
States prior to attaining the age of 16,” (2) have two U.S.-citizen 
parents, and (3) “reasonably believed . . . he or she was a citizen” 
when the false statement was made.150 A noncitizen who does not 
fall under this narrow exception will be permanently barred from 
entering or re-entering the United States if they are found to be in-
admissible or deportable under the false-citizenship provisions.151 
The provisions’ unwaivable bar resembles the consequences of ag-
gravated felony offenses like murder or drug trafficking.152 Thus, 
without a materiality requirement, the false-citizenship provisions 
would “produce draconian results.”153 
 
 147 Munoz-Avila v. Holder, 716 F.3d 976, 978 (7th Cir. 2013) (stating that 8 
U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii) “has been characterized as the ‘immigrant version of 
the death penalty,’ because [it] cannot be waived by the Attorney General and 
therefore operates as a permanent bar” (quoting Sandoval v. Holder, 641 F.3d 982, 
984–85 (8th Cir. 2011))); see also Dakura v. Holder, 772 F.3d 994, 998 (4th Cir. 
2014). 
 148 See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(iii) (authorizing waiver for clause (i), but not 
clause (ii)); § 1127(a)(1)(H) (same); § 1227(a)(3)(D); see also Patel, 917 F.3d at 
1329; Godfrey v. Lynch, 811 F.3d 1013, 1019 (8th Cir. 2016) (recognizing that 
there is no waiver for falsely claiming U.S. citizenship to obtain a benefit under 
§ 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)). 
 149 Matter of Zhang, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 571 (emphasis added). 
 150 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(f), 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(II), 1227(a)(3)(D)(ii). This excep-
tion almost exclusively applies to foreign-born children who were adopted by U.S. 
citizens and did not realize they still needed to naturalize to become U.S. citizens. 
Sandoval, 641 F.3d at 986. 
 151 See Patel, 917 F.3d at 1329; Munoz-Avila, 716 F.3d at 978; Sandoval, 641 
F.3d at 984–85; Dakura, 772 F.3d at 998. 
 152 See Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 560 U.S. 563, 566 (2010) (stating that 
the designation “aggravated felony” under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) consists of “a 
category of crimes singled out for the harshest deportation consequences”). 
 153 See Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 780 (1988) (declining to read 
a materiality element into § 1101(f)(6) in part because “[a] literal reading of the 
statute does not produce draconian results”). 
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The precedential BIA decision in Matter of Zhang illustrates the 
statute’s breadth.154 In that case, a noncitizen unlawfully obtained a 
Certificate of Naturalization from a former immigration officer, then 
used that Certificate to apply for a U.S. passport.155 After he was 
placed in removal proceedings and charged as deportable under 
8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(3)(D), the noncitizen argued that he was not de-
portable because he believed he was a U.S. citizen when he obtained 
the Certificate of Naturalization and, thus, applied for the U.S. pass-
port in good faith.156 This argument required the BIA to decide 
whether a noncitizen’s “false claim to United States citizenship must 
be made knowingly to render him or her removable.”157 The BIA 
determined that it did not.158 Because the noncitizen had made the 
false claim of citizenship when applying for a U.S. passport (unde-
niably a “benefit” under federal law),159 the BIA determined that he 
was deportable under the false-citizenship provision regardless of 
whether he genuinely believed he was a U.S. citizen.160 
Without a materiality element, the false-citizenship provisions 
will thus lead to draconian outcomes. For example, imagine a person 
held a U.S. passport and genuinely believed he was a U.S. citizen. 
He obtained a New York driver’s license and, on the application, he 
indicated that he was a U.S. citizen. Then, the U.S. government 
placed him in removal proceedings and charged him as removable 
for making a false claim of U.S. citizenship on his driver’s license 
application after it discovered that the noncitizen was not, in fact, a 
U.S. citizen.161 In New York, even undocumented immigrants are 
 
 154 Matter of Zhang, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 572. 
 155 Id. at 569–70. 
 156 Id. at 570. 
 157 Id. 
 158 Id. at 572 (“[U]nder the plain language of that section, it is not necessary 
to show intent to establish that a[ noncitizen] is deportable for making a false 
representation of United States citizenship. A[ noncitizen] need only falsely claim 
to be a United States citizen for any purpose or benefit under the Act or any Fed-
eral or State law to be deportable.”). 
 159 See, e.g., Sowah v. Gonzales, 196 F. App’x 576, 577 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 160 Id. 
 161 While this example may sound far-fetched, the extraordinary complexities 
of naturalization law relating to the acquisition and derivation of U.S. citizenship 
at birth, among other things, make this concern all too real. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1401–
1409, 1431, 1433. To provide just one example, the U.S. government has 
 
2021] DOES IT REALLY MATTER? 1239 
 
eligible for a driver’s license,162 so a materiality requirement would 
protect such a person from being deported for answering a wholly 
irrelevant citizenship question in a manner he believed to be truthful. 
Under the Eleventh Circuit’s contrary reading, however, such a per-
son would be deportable and permanently barred from residing in 
the United States based on an innocent mistake (indeed, for answer-
ing a question in a manner he genuinely believed to be truthful) that 
led to no benefit at all. 
Thus, the Eleventh Circuit’s assertion that the “under Federal or 
State law” language in the false-citizenship provisions adequately 
limits the provisions’ reach is misguided.163 That language limits 
only the type of “purpose or benefit” covered by the provisions: It 
must be a purpose or benefit provided under the law. But that lan-
guage leaves open the reality that, under the Eleventh Circuit’s read-
ing, a noncitizen could be permanently removed from the United 
States for unknowingly making a false claim of U.S. citizenship for 
any type of purpose or benefit under the law—even if the noncitizen 
would have been eligible for the benefit regardless of their citizen-
ship status. This does not comport with Congress’s intent in enacting 
the false-citizenship provisions: “to address abuse in the employ-
ment verification process by [noncitizens], as well as the fraud and 
 
questioned the citizenship status of many persons who were birthed with the as-
sistance of a midwife in the Rio Grande Valley of Texas, and the government has 
revoked passports or refused to issue passports to such persons, even absent any 
evidence of fraud or misrepresentation. See, e.g., Martinez v. Sec’y of State, 652 
F. App’x 758, 759–61 (11th Cir. 2016); Eva Garcia Mendoza, Immigration Judge 
vs. Passport Agency – the Battle Over Mario’s Citizenship Is Finally Over, THINK 
IMMIG. BLOG (Jan. 28, 2020), https://thinkimmigration.org/blog/2020/01/28/im-
migration-judge-vs-passport-agency-the-battle-over-marios-citizenship-is-fi-
nally-over/; Kevin Sieff, U.S. Is Denying Passports to Americans Along the Bor-




 162 See N.Y. VEH. & TRAFF. LAW §§ 201(f)(12), 502(c), 502(e). 
 163 Patel v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 917 F.3d 1319, 1331 (11th Cir. 2019) (quoting 
Matter of Richmond, 26 I. & N. Dec. 779, 784 (B.I.A. 2016)), aff’d en banc, 971 
F.3d 1258 (11th Cir. 2020). 
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abuse committed by illegal [noncitizens] to obtain public services 
and benefits that are limited to United States citizens.”164 
Accordingly, reading the false-citizenship provisions to include 
a materiality element, consistent with the Supreme Court’s focus on 
common-law language the provisions deploy, adds an important 
limiting principle and accords with “the longstanding principle of 
construing any lingering ambiguities in deportation statutes in favor 
of the [noncitizen].”165 
CONCLUSION 
In holding that no materiality is required under the false-citizen-
ship provisions, the Eleventh Circuit ignored the provisions’ com-
mon-law language, broke with the provisions’ precedential interpre-
tations, and enabled the U.S. government to subject noncitizens to 
the “immigrant version of the death penalty”166 for innocent conduct 
that results in no benefit to the noncitizen. While the Eleventh Cir-
cuit’s decision in Patel is binding on immigration courts and BIA 
decisions within its jurisdiction, its weight is merely persuasive in 
other courts; for the reasons explained in this Article, other circuits 
can and should reject Patel when interpreting the false-citizenship 
provisions.167 
 
 164 Matter of Richmond, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 783 (citing legislative history of 
the false-citizenship provisions). 
 165 INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 449 (1987). 
 166 Munoz-Avila v. Holder, 716 F.3d 976, 978 (7th Cir. 2013). 
 167 Matter of Anselmo, 20 I. & N. Dec. 25, 31 (B.I.A. 1989) (“We are not 
required to accept an adverse determination by one circuit court of appeals as 
binding throughout the United States. Where we disagree with a court’s position 
on a given issue, we decline to follow it outside the court’s circuit. But, we have 
historically followed a court’s precedent in cases arising in that circuit.” (first cit-
ing Ga. Dep’t of Med. Assistance v. Bowen, 846 F.2d 708, 710 (11th Cir. 1988); 
then citing Ry. Lab. Execs.’ Ass’n v. I.C.C., 784 F.2d 959, 964 (9th Cir. 1986); 
and then citing Generali v. D’Amico, 766 F.2d 485, 489 (11th Cir. 1985))). 
 
